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The Politics of Legitimacy and
Hungary’s Postwar Transition
M A R K P I T T A W A Y
The years between Hungary’s occupation by the Red Army that concluded its
traumatic involvement in the Second World War and the construction of socialist
dictatorship in the country at the end of the 1940s constitute a moment of transition, a
moment that is central to understanding the subsequent development of the country.
For this reason the interpretation of this moment of transition has been mired in
controversy. For much of the Cold War, Western historiography characterised this
moment as one defined by the ruthless drive of the Hungarian Communist Party
and the country’s Soviet occupiers to eliminate political opponents and thus pave the
way for dictatorship.1 Others argued that the moment of postwar transition should
be separated from the dictatorship that followed it and should instead be seen as a
distinct sub-period, in Charles Gati’s words a ‘democratic interlude’ before the onset
of Stalinism.2 The subsequent collapse of Hungary’s socialist dictatorship has not
led to any kind of scholarly consensus about the meaning of the postwar transition.
The polarised nature of the country’s post-socialist politics have resulted in historians
attempting to appropriate aspects of the immediate postwar years to contribute to
essentially political debates about Hungary’s present. Some have seen the postwar
transition as being ‘an attempt to introduce a state based on the rule of law and its
failure’, thus arguing that the transitions in the middle and at the end of the twentieth
century were directly comparable.3 For historians associated with the conservative
right, however, postwar anti-fascist purges formed no more than a cynical attempt
by the country’s Soviet occupiers and their domestic clients to lay the foundations of
a ‘totalitarian’ regime.4
1 Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, rev. and enlarged edn (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 3–64. Bennett Kovrig, Communism in Hungary: From Kun to
Ka´da´r (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), 153–230. George Scho¨pflin, ‘Hungary’, in Martin
McCauley, ed., Communist Power in Europe, 1944–1949 (London: Macmillan, in association with the School
of Slavonic and East European Studies, 1977), 95–110.
2 Charles Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986), 13–123.
3 Ma´ria Palasik, A joga´llamisa´g megteremte´se´nek kı´se´rlete e´s kudarca Magyarorsza´gon, 1944–1949 (Budapest:
Napvila´g Kiado´, 2000).
4 Sa´ndor Szaka´cs and Tibor Zinner, A ha´boru´ ‘megva´ltozott terme´szete’ – Adatok e´s adale´kok, te´nyek e´s
o¨sszefu¨gge´sek – 1944–1948 (Budapest: Batthya´ny Ta´rsasa´g, 1997).
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Almost all the scholarly work on Hungary’s moment of transition has focused either
on the actions of the superpowers or on the dynamics of high politics within the
country. Studies that use the perspectives of social history to understand the moment
of transition are virtually non-existent, and there is a dearth of work on the social
history of the postwar period more generally.5 There have been no studies that focus
on the social dimensions of politics during the postwar transition, despite the fact that
such a perspective has much to reveal about the nature of the transitional moment.
This article is a preliminary attempt to fill some of that gap in a way that will both
stimulate further research and reveal the potential that studying the social dimension of
politics in the mid- and late 1940s has for improving our understanding of Hungary’s
moment of transition. It focuses on what I term the politics of legitimacy that
accompanied the postwar transition, as various political actors struggled to legitimate
their respective visions of the country’s future.
For political scientists legitimacy is measured principally in terms of how far a given
political regime is legitimated according to a set of social norms and expectations
that are essentially ahistorical. For example, David Beetham argues that legitimate
power can be discerned if the exercise of power conforms to rules that are established
either legally or socially, that those rules can be justified in terms of the belief systems
of both dominant and subordinate groups and if subordinate groups consent to the
exercise of power.6 Measured by these criteria, Hungary, shaken by war, occupation
and an enforced change of regime, cannot be said to have had a truly ‘legitimate’
regime at any point during the twentieth century, at least prior to the democratic
transition of the 1990s. This does not mean, however, that the concept of legitimacy
is an inappropriate one. Through analysing the attempts of the various political actors
to legitimate their rule in the light of the belief systems of subordinate groups and the
patterns of consent and opposition to that rule, it is possible to sketch the contours of
a politics of legitimacy in Hungary following the end of the Second World War. That
politics of legitimacy was intimately linked to the process of postwar state formation
in the country and is thus fundamental to understanding both the nature of the
political system that existed during the country’s transitional moment and the social
constraints under which political actors operated.
A focus on the politics of legitimacy as a dynamic and incomplete process points to
the need to integrate the history of Hungary’s postwar transition into a much longer
history of political conflict over the nature of the country’s political and social system.
Shaken by the defeat of Austria-Hungary in the First World War, the dismemberment
of the old kingdom of Hungary as a result of the postwar Treaty of Trianon, the brief
history of the Soviet Republic in 1919, and violent counter-revolution, there was little
5 For some exceptions to this rule see Sa´ndor Horva´th, La´szlo´ Petho´´ and Eszter Zso´fia To´th,
eds., Munka´sto¨rte´net – Munka´santropolo´gia (Budapest: Napvila´g Kiado´, 2003); Mark Pittaway, ‘The
Reproduction of Hierarchy: Skill, Working-Class Culture and the State in Early Socialist Hungary’,
Journal of Modern History, 74, 4 (2002), 737–69; Tibor Valuch, Magyarorsza´g ta´rsadalomto¨rte´nete a XX. sza´zad
ma´sodik fele´ben (Budapest: Osiris Kiado´, 2001); and Zsuzsanna Varga, Politika, paraszti e´rdeke´rve´nyesı´te´s e´s
szo¨vetkezetek Magyarorsza´gon 1956–1967 (Budapest: Napvila´g Kiado´, 2001).
6 David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), 16.
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consensus in interwar Hungary over what a legitimate form of political rule might
look like. The country was governed by a deeply conservative regime headed by the
regent, Admiral Miklo´s Horthy, characterised by an oligarchic parliamentarism that
rested on an uneasy alliance between the aristocratic elite and the radical right. Held
together by irredentism, anti-socialism and an increasingly aggressive antisemitism,
it was able to rule with considerable support from the ‘Christian’ middle classes
and propertied groups more generally. Communist parties were banned, while the
moderate Social Democrats (Magyarorsza´gi Szocia´ldemokrata Pa´rt – MSZDP) gained
only token parliamentary representation in view of the restricted franchise, as did the
Independent Smallholders’ Party (Fu¨ggetlen Kisgazdapa´rt – FKgP), formed by those
parliamentary deputies who remained outside the governing elite because of their
advocacy of radical land reform that challenged aristocratic hegemony. Consequently,
the working class, agricultural labourers and smallholders were largely excluded from
the political system, which they experienced as profoundly repressive – a feeling
intensified by the economic crises which the country experienced during the early
1930s.7
The deep-seated social conflict over legitimacy, to which the interwar regime was
a response, intensified as a result of Hungary’s traumatic involvement in the Second
World War. Trapped by its desire to regain territories Hungary ‘lost’ at Trianon,
domestic radical right-wing mobilisation and official antisemitism, the country was
drawn into war on the side of Germany. This resulted in military catastrophe on the
Don in early 1943, domestic discontent that strengthened those demanding radical
social reform and an abortive attempt to switch sides to the Allies, motivated by fear of
Soviet invasion that in turn led to German occupation in March 1944. The following
nine months saw the deportation and murder of the majority of the country’s Jewish
population, the removal of Horthy and his replacement by a puppet regime headed
by the National Socialist Arrow Cross, and finally the invasion and occupation of
Hungary by the Red Army.8 Established state institutions collapsed as their officials
fled in the face of the Red Army’s advance, forcing the country’s new occupiers to
construct a new state almost from scratch.
Legitimacy was crucial to the project of shaping a new state from the beginning,
due to popular distrust of the country’s occupiers. Many Hungarians feared the arrival
7 The following accounts shed light on the interwar Hungarian regime: Igna´c Romsics, Magyarorsza´g
To¨rte´nete a XX. Sza´zadban (Budapest: Osiris Kiado´, 1999); Andrew C. Janos, The Politics of
Backwardness in Hungary 1825–1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982); Ga´bor Gya´ni,
‘Magyarorsza´g ta´rsadalomto¨rte´nete a Horthy-korban’, in Ga´bor Gya´ni and Gyo¨rgy Ko¨ve´r, Magyarorsza´g
ta´rsadalomto¨rte´nete a reformkorto´l a ma´sodik vila´gha´boru´ig (Budapest: Osiris Kiado´, 1998), 167–356; and Steven
Be´la Va´rdy, ‘The Impact of Trianon upon the Hungarian Mind: Irredentism and Hungary’s Path to War’,
in Na´ndor Dreisziger, ed., Hungary in the Age of Total War (1938–1948) (Boulder, CO: East European
Monographs, 1998), 27–48.
8 On the war years see Randolph L. Braham, The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary,
condensed edn (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2000); Cecil D. Eby, Hungary at War: Civilians
and Soldiers in World War II (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1998). Gyo¨rgy Lengyel,
ed., Hungarian Economy and Society during World War II , trans. Judit Pokoly (Boulder, CO: East European
Monographs, 1993).
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of the Red Army before it crossed the country’s eastern border, given the anti-
communism of much of the population and perceptions of Russian ‘barbarity’ that
were reinforced by state propaganda. The behaviour of Red Army troops towards
Hungarian civilians, characterised by rape and looting, when combined with the
policies of the Soviet occupation authorities who deported large numbers of male
civilians and insisted on the immediate payment of reparations, transformed distrust
into outright hostility. The new ‘Popular Front’ provisional government established
in the eastern city of Debrecen in December 1944 under the auspices of the country’s
occupiers and the Hungarian Communist Party (Magyar Kommunista Pa´rt – MKP)
was forced to domesticate the new regime by constructing a new state that was at
least visibly, if not operationally, separate from the occupation authorities and thus
able to acquire a degree of legitimacy within the society it sought to govern.
State formation and the search for legitimacy in postwar Hungary were intimately
linked. While the new state was able to acquire despotic power to an extent through
the support of the Soviet occupation authorities, it was forced to achieve a degree of
‘infrastructural’ power – that is the power to enforce its will on an everyday level –
through mobilising certain social groups to populate its local institutions and thus
assert its authority.9 State formation, therefore, entailed the search on the part of
Hungary’s new rulers for a viable social base on which their new state could be built,
and involved them in confronting the issue of legitimacy. While the Popular Front
government was a coalition of all anti-fascist parties, it was numerically dominated by
the left, particularly the MKP. In constructing and populating the institutions of the
postwar state, the left was forced to appeal directly to those social groups effectively
excluded from the interwar political system, those who were determined to see no
return either to the policies of the Horthy era or the war years. This proved too
restricted a social base to enable the state to secure its authority, thus laying the social
foundations of future political conflict. The industrial working class provided the
most secure base of the new state, allowing the country’s new rulers to consolidate
their authority in factories and urban centres. Attempts to appeal to smallholders
and the urban middle class, however, backfired. While the state directly involved the
rural poor through radical land reform, only in parts of the country did this bring the
country’s new rulers a real political dividend. It instead created a political culture in
most rural areas based on small-scale land ownership that proved deeply resistant to
the egalitarianism promoted by the new state. Furthermore, the broad middle-class
groups, who had supported the interwar regime, were deeply disoriented by their
loss of status and alienated from the new state.
The weaknesses in the left’s attempt to create legitimate state authority were
exploited by the FKgP, which had emerged as the most conservative of the anti-
fascist parties in the Popular Front coalition. They were able to rally a coalition of
9 I have borrowed the notions of the ‘despotic’ and ‘infrastructural’ power of the state from Michael
Mann, ‘The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results’, in Michael Mann,
States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology (Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988),
5–9.
The Politics of Legitimacy and Hungary’s Postwar Transition 457
agricultural smallholders and the middle class, in order to shape a political project
that offered Hungary a thoroughly democratised conservatism which rose from the
ruins of the authoritarian conservatism of the interwar years. This project implied
that under its auspices the nature and direction of postwar state formation could rest
on alternative notions of legitimacy to those used by the left. It also transformed the
FKgP from the small party, based largely on the propertied peasantry, that had existed
during the interwar years into a catch-all party representing centre-right opinion,
allowing it to win an overall majority of both votes and seats in the November 1945
parliamentary elections. The breadth of support for this alternative political project
dashed left-wing hopes of legitimating their vision of the postwar state through
democratic means. The conflict between these two attempts to shape a legitimate
political regime formed the backdrop to the bitter political struggles that rested on
social polarisation between those who feared a return to the policies of the interwar
years on the one hand and those who feared socialist dictatorship on the other. The
conflict, moreover, had a central impact on the formation of political identities that
shaped the attitudes of ordinary Hungarians towards the emergent political parties.
Most importantly, it formed the backdrop to the country’s slide into dictatorship
that characterised the late 1940s as the international pressures on Hungary’s Soviet
occupiers changed.
The politics of legitimacy and the formation of the postwar state, 1944–5
The arrival of the Red Army on Hungarian soil during late 1944 prompted the
collapse of state authority in the eastern half of the country as Soviet troops swept
towards Budapest. The majority of the aristocracy, public officials and professionals
fled, shocked at the catastrophe that had overtaken them as the country became a
theatre of conflict and frightened of likely Soviet retribution, in view of Hungary’s
participation in the war on the side of Nazi Germany. At the crossing of the River
Tisza at the town of Szolnok ‘the whole of the lordly population of the lands east
of the Tisza queued . . . and went towards Budapest’.10 Behind Red Army lines the
country’s new rulers estimated that between 70 and 80 per cent of all state employees
had fled in the face of the Soviet advance.11 The weak provisional government
established in Debrecen by the Soviets, based as it was on political groupings with
no connection to their potential supporters, was unable to fill the power vacuum
that emerged.12 As Hungary’s territory was progressively ‘liberated’ during early 1945
and the provisional government moved to Budapest, the task of constructing a new
state with a viable social base became ever more urgent. The obstacles to this goal,
10 Istva´n Ma´rkus, ‘Urak Futa´sa’ reprinted in his Az Ismeretlen Fo´´szereplo´´: Tanulma´nyok (Budapest:
Sze´pirodalmi Ko¨nyvkiado´, 1991), 87.
11 Miha´ly Korom, A Ne´pi Bizottsa´gok e´s a Ko¨zigazgata´s Magyarorsza´gon 1944–1945 (Budapest: Kossuth
Ko¨nyvkiado´, 1984), 17.
12 Miha´ly Korom, Magyarorsza´g Ideiglenes Nemzeti Korma´nya e´s a Fegyverszu¨net, 1944–1945 (Budapest:
Akade´miai Kiado´, 1981); and Miklo´s M. Szabo´, A Magyarorsza´gi Felszabadı´to´ Hadmu´´veletek, 1944–1945
(Budapest: Kossuth Ko¨nyvkiado´, 1985).
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however, remained formidable, given the marked unpopularity of the Red Army and
the economic chaos that convulsed the country.
Prior to the siege of Budapest, as Soviet troops moved across eastern Hungary
their behaviour towards the population generated considerable resentment.13 The
Red Army’s occupation of Budapest and major industrial centres in early 1945
revealed the brutality of its occupation policies in three principal ways, all of which
would have relevance for the legitimacy of the postwar order. The first of these was
the widespread use of rape against the female population. Because of social stigma
and political taboo no serious attempt was ever made to measure its extent at the
time. It was a widespread experience, nevertheless, as attempts to estimate its extent
from examinations of the birthrate, recourse to abortion and the recorded incidence
of sexually transmitted disease have shown.14
The second major act of the Soviet occupying forces was the deportation of
large numbers of male civilians to the Soviet Union. A Red Army order issued in
December 1944 forced the Interior Ministry of the new Hungarian government to
prepare a list of those with German names in order that they perform forced labour for
the war effort. In reality, it allowed for the indiscriminate rounding up and detention
of able-bodied men across the country.15 The total numbers rounded up in this way
were substantial, though precise numbers are again difficult to estimate. In U´jpest, on
the northern fringe of the Greater Budapest conurbation, the factory committee of
the Chinoin pharmaceuticals factory reported to the Ministry of Popular Welfare in
February 1945 that ‘the Red Army has taken away large numbers of our skilled
workers partly because of their German names’.16 Deported civilians formed a
substantial proportion of the 570,000 Hungarian prisoners of war who were held
by the Soviet Union during the second half of the 1940s.17
The third major problem was the reparations policy of the Soviets. The ceasefire
agreement between Hungary and the Allies allowed the Soviet authorities to seek
reparations in the form of finished products or fixed industrial plant.18 In the
13 Sa´ndor Ma´rai, Memoir of Hungary, 1944–1948, trans. with an introduction and notes by Albert Tezla
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 1996), 24–113; Chris Hann, Ta´zla´r: A Village in Hungary
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 159; and Martha Lampland, The Object
of Labor: Commodification in Socialist Hungary (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1995), 113.
14 Andrea Peto´´, ‘Memory and the Narrative of Rape in Budapest and Vienna in 1945’, in Richard
Bessel and Dirk Schumann, eds., Life After Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe
during the 1940s and 1950s (Washington, DC, and Cambridge: German Historical Institute and Cambridge
University Press, 2003), 129–48.
15 Gyo¨rgy Zielbauer, ‘Magyar polga´ri lako´sok deporta´la´sa e´s hadifogsa´ga (1945–1948)’, To¨rte´nelmi
Szemle, 34 (3–4) (1992), 270–91.
16 ‘A Chinoin Gyo´gyszer e´s Vegye´szeti Terme´kek Gya´ra Rt. u¨zemi bizottsa´gi elno¨ke´nek jelente´se a
ne´pjo´le´leti miniszterhez: a va´llalat az orsza´gnak fontos ege´szse´gu¨gyi ba´zisa, u¨zembe helyeze´se su¨rgo´´s. A
gya´rta´s megindı´ta´sa´nak proble´mai’, in Ka´roly Jenei, ed., AMunka´ssa´g az U¨zemeke´rt a Termele´se´rt 1944–1945:
Dokumentumgyu´´jteme´ny (Budapest: Ta´nsics Ko¨nyvkiado´, 1970), 251.
17 Iva´n Peto´´ and Sa´ndor Szaka´cs, A hazai gazdasa´g ne´gy e´vtizede´nek to¨rte´nete I: Az u´jja´e´pı´te´s e´s a
tervutası´ta´sos ira´nyı´ta´s ido´´szaka 1945–1968 (Budapest: Ko¨zgazdasa´gi e´s Jo´gi Ko¨nyvkiado´, 1985), 17.
18 Ibid., 21.
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immediate aftermath of ‘liberation’, industrial plants operated under the Soviet
military authorities producing directly for the war effort, and they returned to civilian
production in late spring 1945.19 Some industries continued to produce directly for
reparations purposes; in others the Soviet military authorities sought to dismantle
factories and transport their machinery to the east.20 Where this was done, it had
catastrophic consequences for the workers affected. This in turn resulted in significant
levels of opposition to left-wing activists, particularly communists, on the shop floor
when production was restarted.21
The unpopularity of the Soviets compromised many of the new state institutions,
especially when they were seen to work in concert with the Red Army. This
was particularly true during early 1945 of the police force, which was created
from the ranks of left-wing activists. They were primarily occupied in identifying
sources of potential political opposition to the new regime and deliberately avoided
recruiting those who had served in prewar elite units, such as the Royal Hungarian
Gendarmerie, into the ranks.22 They were seen as largely inseparable from the Soviet
occupation regime, and were associated with the arbitrary actions of the Red Army.
This problem was neatly illustrated by the way in which local populations, particularly
in the working-class suburbs of Greater Budapest, confused the imprisonment of
Hungarian civilians by Soviet troops with attempts by the new police force and local
authorities to organise reconstruction efforts. U´jpest resident Miklo´s Pe´terffy recalled
that ‘during that time there was the ‘little robot’, they took people away to rebuild
bridges, or took them as prisoners-of-war’.23 This confusion was not surprising. As
the Red Army rounded up able-bodied men, the police organised those without
gainful employment into brigades to rebuild their communities.24 This resulted in
fear of the police and a culture of mistrust between state organs and the population.25
The collapse of old state institutions, distrust of new ones and a deep-seated fear
of the occupying authorities contributed to an atmosphere of generalised disorder,
exacerbated by the parlous economic situation, that in part manifested itself in a
substantial crime wave during 1945. In the factories the supply of food and fuel
that factory committees could guarantee was often insufficient to meet the needs
of the workers for survival, forcing workers to pilfer from their factories in order
19 Iva´n T. Berend, U´jja´e´pı´te´s e´s a nagyto´´ke elleni harc Magyarorsza´gon 1945–1948 (Budapest: Ko¨zgazdasa´gi
e´s Jo´gi Ko¨nyvkiado´, 1962), 28–30.
20 Ferenc Ga´spa´r, ‘A Magyar Nagyipari Munka´ssa´g Harca az U¨zemek Megmente´se´e´rt Helyrea´llı´ta´sa´e´rt
e´s a Termele´s Megindı´ta´sa´e´rt 1944–1945’, in Jenei, A Munka´ssa´g az U¨zemeke´rt a Termele´se´rt, 58.
21 I discuss one such example in Mark Pittaway, ‘Workers in Hungary’, in Eleanor Breuning, Jill Lewis
and Gareth Pritchard, eds., Power and the people: A Social History of Central European Politics, 1945–1956
(Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, forthcoming, 2005).
22 Szaka´cs and Zinner, A ha´boru´ megva´ltozott terme´szete, 75–144; and Andra´s Zolta´n Kova´cs,
‘Csendo´´rsors Magyarorsza´gon 1945-uta´n’, in Imre Okva´th, ed., Katonai perek a kommunista diktatu´ra
ido´´szaka´ban 1945–1958 (Budapest: To¨rte´neti Hivatal, 2001), 103–140.
23 1956-os Inte´zet Oral History Archivium (1956 Institute Oral History archive, hereafter OHA),
181 – Pe´terffy Miklo´s, 57.
24 ‘Rendet a ko¨zmunka´k te´ren !’, Szabad U´jpest, 24 Feb. 1945, 2.
25 ‘Megint a ko¨zmunka’, Szabad U´jpest, 17 March 1945, 2.
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to participate in the barter economy.26 Outside the factory gates during 1945 ‘the
deterioration of economic circumstances and unstoppable inflation created a huge
crime wave among the population of the capital’.27
War brought economic ruin in its wake. The military conflict in the country
during autumn 1944 severely disrupted agricultural work.28 Estimates of war damage
to national property were enormous; in the summer of 1945 the industrial employers
association GYOSZ calculated that war losses to industrial buildings amounted to
some 16.22 per cent of their 1938 value, the damage to raw materials some 11.21
per cent and that to completed products some 23.79 per cent.29 This devastation
was particularly intense in Budapest. In the Ganz Vaggon factory, one of the capital’s
largest industrial enterprises, most of the plant buildings were damaged and some 70
to 80 per cent of the machinery had been destroyed. When the factory committee
restarted production in late January 1945 it employed 786 workers, as opposed to
an estimated 8,000 who had worked there in October 1944.30 Given the collapse of
transport and production, attempts to restart industrial production were plagued by
severe shortages; the capital’s shipyards were hampered by a lack of coal, wood and
spare parts.31 Absolute shortages of food increased the desperation of the situation. In
spring 1945 the Ganz Vaggon’s factory committee admitted that it was only able to
guarantee food with a calorific level of 35 per cent of what was needed by a manual
worker.32
In this situation, barter replaced the markets that had collapsed during the conflict.
In Tataba´nya skilled metalworkers ‘were sent out to work in the villages for free to
repair the tractors, the threshing machines and the mills’ in exchange for food.33
This was distributed by the factory committees with the evident intention of
retaining their workforces in an economic climate in which the value of money
wages had been reduced to almost nothing.34 Distrust of state institutions and
the occupation authorities led new local authorities and producers to guard their
26 Politikato¨rte´neti e´s Szakszervezeti Leve´lta´r (Archive of Political History and Trade Unions, hereafter
PtSzL), A Volt Szakszervezeti Ko¨zpo¨nti Leve´lta´r anyaga (Papers from the former Central Archive of Trade
Unions, hereafter SZKL), Vasas Szakszervezet iratai (Papers of the Metalworkers’ Union, hereafter Vasas)/
37d./1945, ‘Jelente´s gya´ri lopa´sokro´l’.
27 ‘Re´szlet Budapest rendo´´rfo´´ka´pita´nya´nak a ko¨zigazgata´si bizottsa´g sza´ma´ra a rendo´´rse´g 1945.
ma´sodik fe´le´ve´ben kifejtett teve´ke´nyse´ge´ro´´l ke´szitett jelente´se´bo´´l, 1946 janua´r 26’ in Ferenc Ga´spa´r,
ed., Forra´sok Budapest To¨rte´nete´hez IV: 1945–1950 (Budapest: Budapest Fo´´va´ros Leve´lta´ra, 1973), 215.
28 Magda M. Somlyai, ‘Az 1945-o¨s Fo¨ldreform’, in Magda M. Somlyai, ed., Fo¨ldreform 1945, Tanulma´ny
e´s Dokumentumgyu´´jteme´ny (Budapest: Kossuth Ko¨nyvkiado´, 1965), 29–30.
29 ‘Magyarorsza´g Ipara 1945 nya´ran’, in Sa´ndor Tonelli, ed., Ipari Ujja´e´pite´su¨nk (Budapest: Forum
Hungaricum Kiada´s, 1948), 17.
30 PtSzL SZKL Vasas/37d./1945, ‘A Ganz e´s Ta´rsa U¨zemi Bizottsa´ga´nak 1945. e´vi za´ro´ jelente´se’, 3;
Idid., ‘Ta´je´koztato´, Budapest 1945.februa´r 23’, 2.
31 Ibid., ‘Memorandum a Ganz hajo´gya´ri dolgozo´k helyzete´ro´´l e´s kiva´nsa´gairo´l’, 2.
32 Ibid., ‘Jelente´s a Ganz-kocsigya´r 1945.e´vi ege´szse´gi helyzete´ro´´l’, 2.
33 PtSzL, Politikato¨rte´neti Inte´zet Leve´lta´ra (Archive of the Institute for the History of Politics,
hereafter PIL), 867f.K-306, 7.
34 For an example see Magyar Orsza´gos Leve´lta´r (Hungarian National Archive, hereafter MOL),
Magyar Pamutipar U¨zemi Bizottsa´g iratai (Papers of the Factory Committee of the Magyar Pamutipar,
hereafter Z1204)/1cs./1t., 35–6.
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autonomy jealously and subvert state attempts to reconstruct the shattered economy.
In agricultural communities, such as the town of Martonva´sa´r during the harvest of
1945, smallholders kept what they needed for subsistence while the local ‘national
committee’ – the new postwar local authority gave priority to feeding its own landless
poor from the surplus, subverting state attempts to feed the industrial centres.35
The left was therefore forced both to put distance between new state institutions
and the Soviet occupation authorities and to emphasise the importance of
reconstruction in order to legitimate its rule. In order to do this, leading actors
within the Popular Front government, particularly the MKP, deployed an ideology of
‘democratic, national reconstruction’. The state was labelled ‘a new democracy’. This
concept, worked out by the exiled Communist leadership in Moscow, relied as much
on notions of democratised property ownership as it did on any notion of political
freedom or representative government. According to Ma´tya´s Ra´kosi, the secretary of
the MKP, it meant a state that realised the aspirations of the poor peasantry and the
working class. As far as the rural population was concerned, he argued that ‘the acid
test of the new democracy is the land question. He who does not want to see land
given to the peasants, who wants to retain the system of great estates, is an enemy of
Hungarian democracy.’ For industrial communities ‘the basic demand of Hungarian
democracy is the immediate abolition of any obstacle to the full economic and
political realisation of the power of the working class’.36 Communists differentiated
between what they saw as ‘socialism’ and ‘democracy’. For them ‘democracy’ was
a stage when capitalist relations continued to exist, but also when the state, acting
as the agent of the working class, peasantry and progressive intelligentsia, exerted
considerable pressure for greater social equality and social ownership.37
This was tied in left-wing rhetoric to plebeian Magyar nationalism. For Ra´kosi
the task of the new state was ‘the construction . . . of a new democratic homeland’.38
This combination of a left-wing notion of ‘democracy’ and plebeian nationalism
was tied to an ideology of reconstruction which, in view of the situation of the
country, had obvious appeal and served to emphasise the state’s attempts to overcome
postwar economic devastation. The use of Magyar nationalism allowed leading
political actors on the left to articulate an identity for the new state distinct from the
Soviet occupation authorities. The egalitarianism that underpinned MKP rhetoric
permitted the left to build the state from below by linking it to the social revolution
in the country’s factories and fields that accompanied the end of the Second World
War. Yet in identifying itself with radical social upheaval, the postwar state was only
35 Istva´n Ma´rkus, ‘A Demokra´cia Ke´t E´ve Martonva´sa´ron (Szociogra´fiai va´zlat)’, Forum (1946), 259.
36 Ma´tya´s Ra´kosi, ‘Mi a Magyar Demokra´cia?’, in Ma´tya´s Ra´kosi, Va´logatott Besze´dek e´s Cikkek
(Budapest: Szikra Kiado´, 1950), 47.
37 In the Hungarian context this distinction is clearest in the work of Imre Nagy, Communist
Minister of Agriculture (1945), Minister of the Interior (1945–6), Prime Minister (1953–5;1956) on
the difference between the democratic and socialist transformations of agriculture: see Imre Nagy,
Agra´rpolitikai Tanulma´nyok (Budapest: Szikra Kiado´, 1950), 253–5. The distinction was also implicitly
made by Ra´kosi; see his ‘Fo¨ld, Kenye´r, Szabadsa´g’, repr. in Ra´kosi, Va´logatott Besze´dek e´s Cikkek, 56–70.
38 Quoted in A Ne´pi Demokra´cia U´tja: A Magyar Kommunista Pa´rt III. Kongresszusa´nak Jegyzo´´ko¨nyve
(Budapest: Szikra Kiado´, 1946), 23.
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able to gain a highly limited degree of legitimacy, in that change moved either in
directions that restricted the appeal of the left, as in rural areas, or provoked outright
opposition, as among the urban middle class. Furthermore, the MKP and its allies
were not always able to control the dynamic of social change initiated by postwar
revolutionary transformation.
The left’s attempts to construct a viable social base for their vision of the postwar
state were at their most successful in industrial, working-class communities. In the
factories the industrial working class had been subjected by 1943 to the dictates of
production for the war effort and by the scorched-earth policies of the Germans
and the Arrow Cross as it became obvious that the war was lost. Working-class
anger built against many managers and supervisory staff who implemented despotic
policies in the workplace during the final months of the war. As managers joined
other local elites in the flight from the Red Army, largely left-wing activists set up
factory committees. Some were inspired by illegal Communist Party cells and based
themselves on the memory of the short-lived Soviet Republic. A minority sought the
immediate socialisation of the factory. Most, however, wished to restart production
in the aftermath of war.39 These institutions, most of which were highly localised
responses to the pressures of war and the economic collapse that followed the end
of fighting, were used to populate the new state at the local level, giving the left
institutions in the workplace which it could use to build its authority. Prominent
Communists sought to integrate local organisations such as factory committees
and ‘national committees’ into a political constituency that would support the
‘democratisation’ of postwar Hungary. According to one such prominent figure,
factory committees were ‘the most important basic organisations of the industrial
working class and the new democracy’. Their role was to eschew militancy in the
interests of reconstruction and thus ‘abandon the kind of behaviour that big capital
expects of them’.40 Labour competitions began in spring 1945, introduced by the
left-wing parties and trade unions, to link local reconstruction concerns to national
policies and to the organisational drives of the left-wing parties, particularly the
MKP.41
These drives were successful in building a social base for the left’s state-building
project among the restricted ranks of the urban, industrial working class. The
legitimacy that this vision attained among this group during the first half of 1945
could be seen in the extensive participation of workers in the reconstruction
effort and the rapidly growing membership of trade unions and workers’ parties
39 Ka´roly Jenei, Be´la Ra´cz and Erzse´bet Strassenreiter, ‘Az U¨zemi Bizottsa´gok e´s a Munka´selleno´´rze´s
Megvalo´sula´sa Haza´nkban’, in Ka´roly Jenei, Be´la Ra´cz and Erzse´bet Strassenreiter, eds., Az U¨zemi
Bizottsa´gok a Munka´shatalome´rt 1944–1948 (Budapest: Ta´nsics Ko¨nyvkiado´, 1966), 7–146.
40 Alada´r Mo´d, ‘Az u¨zemi bizottsa´gok e´s az u´jja´e´pı´te´s’, Szakszervezeti Ko¨zlo¨ny, 1 June 1945, 4–5.
41 ‘A csepeli pa´rtszervezet ma´jus 1-i versenyfelhı´va´sa Budapest e´s ko¨rnye´ke pa´rtszervezete´ihez’, Szabad
Ne´p, 25 March 1945; ‘Angyalfo¨ld felel’, Szabad Ne´p, 31 March, 1945. Labour competitions were a series
of campaigns that mobilized workers to achieve certain production or reconstruction goals in their place
of work.
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in the largest factories.42 Memories of the repression, marginalisation and poverty
suffered during the interwar years were fundamental in shaping political identities in
working-class communities. This made many workers receptive to the ‘new
democracy’ being created by the left-dominated Popular Front government.
Budapest’s MA´VAG factory in late 1945was, according to the social observer, Erzse´bet
Severini, populated by ‘sickly, thin people’. Yet, despite malnourishment, workers
participated eagerly in campaigns to reshape the factory. One worker told her that he
worked ‘to see what will become of the democracy’. Unemployed for much of the
1930s, he wanted no return to the anti-working-class policies of the interwar years;
he wanted a more socially just Hungary.43
Yet white-collar staff could not be counted on to provide a social base for the state
in the factories in the way in which industrial workers could. The functions that the
state devolved to factory committees were not merely restricted to those that served
reconstruction: worker representatives played a central role in implementing many of
the ‘anti-fascist’ measures mandated by the new state. White-collar employees in both
public administration and industry were subjected to ‘verification’ when returning
to their jobs; this forced them effectively to prove their loyalty to the new system. In
factories the experience of being judged by worker representatives chosen by factory
committees alienated social groups such as engineers and factory white-collar staff
who were crucial to the reconstruction effort.44 Yet it was also a sop to working-
class opinion which demanded retribution against managers and supervisors. Many
white-collar workers fled with the Germans in the face of the Red Army advance.
Their subsequent return provoked considerable discontent, and the reappointment of
unpopular supervisors provoked explosive conflict, especially when, as in the mines,
it coincided with failure to pay wages.45
Yet ‘verification’ was not only driven from below. It was one plank in a whole series
of anti-fascist measures that not only were directed against those who had co-operated
with the brief Arrow Cross regime but also came to be directed against many whom
left-wingers perceived to be ‘reactionaries’. They played a central role in generating a
climate of fear and undermined the legitimacy of the regime among most middle-class
Hungarians, not only those who filled managerial and supervisory positions in the
factories. As the Red Army occupied the country, the Hungarian authorities, led by
the political department of the reorganised police, destroyed fascist organisations and
rounded up their members and collaborators. It interned ‘fascists’ in camps distributed
around the country. The net of internment was cast, however, much wider than
former members of the Arrow Cross. The people’s courts – the popular organs of
42 Istva´n To¨mpe, ‘Munka´ban az u¨zemipa´rtszervezet Csepelen’, Pa´rtmunka, 1 July 1945, 34–6.
43 Erzse´bet Severini, Munkaverseny e´s a Magyar Munka´s Lelkise´ge: MA´VAG e´s a Csepeli WM Mu¨vek
(Budapest: Atheaneum, 1946), 65–7.
44 Gyo¨rgy Gyarmati, Ja´nos Botos, Tibor Zinner and Miha´ly Korom, Magyar He´tko¨znapok Ra´kosi
Ma´tya´s Ke´t Emigra´cio´ja Ko¨zo¨tt, 1945–1956 (Budapest: Minerva, 1988), 114–18.
45 ‘A Magyar Ba´nyamunka´sok Szabad Szakszervezete´nek panasza az Iparu¨gyi Miniszteriumhoz: a
ba´nyava´llalatok tulajodonosai nem gondoskodnak a munkabe´rekro´´l e´s a munka´sok e´lelmeze´sro´´l, az u¨zemi
beoszta´sokkal pedig a termele´s szabota´lja´k’, in Jenei, A Munka´ssa´g az U¨zemeke´rt a Termele´se´rt, 506–7.
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justice set up to support the police – were responsible for supervising internment and
often worked closely with the ‘verification committees’ in workplaces. It has been
estimated that 40,000 people were interned between 1945 and 1949. In the capital
alone, 16,949 people were interned up to February 1946.46 Camps were not hidden
from local populations. U´jpest’s had 100 inmates by March 1945, and authorities were
keen to demonstrate to the population that it was not a ‘death camp’, but one which
would allow ‘fascist criminals’ to participate in the reconstruction of the country.47
The spectacle of middle-class detainees from these camps working in the factories
was a curiosity widely reported in left-wing newspapers during 1945 and 1946.48
Middle-class reaction to anti-fascist measures underlined the difficulties
encountered by the representatives of the new state and the left in appealing to the
middle classes, who were largely alienated from the state that was being constructed
around them. As left-wing political thinker Istva´n Bibo´ pointed out, the left-wing
parties appealed to the ‘intelligentsia’. While this group included the ‘progressive’
Budapest intellectuals and groups such as engineers, it excluded enormous sections of
the middle class who had felt comfortable with the interwar regime.49 They greeted
the new regime with a sense of alienation and disorientation. The writer Sa´ndor
Ma´rai recounted that ‘there were those who complained because the flat, the villa,
the magnificent furnishings, thereafter the bank desposit, the upper-class lifestyle, the
whole factitious hierarchy, the neo-baroque snobbery had been obliterated. Others
expected the Americans to come and chase the Bolshevik Russians back to the Soviet
Union, and then everyone will get everything back again; the house owner the house,
the landowner the land, and the nimble-penned, prolix writer the easy success’.50
If the restricted industrial working class constituted the social base of the new state,
while the middle classes were deeply antagonistic the situation in rural communities
was profoundly ambiguous. Social revolution in the Hungarian countryside began
when the Red Army crossed the border into the south-east of the country, the
so-called Viharsa´rok, dominated by a tradition of agrarian socialism. The departure
of the major landholders emboldened the agricultural proletariat and the poorer
smallholders to seize land. Land seizures were legitimised by the local ‘national
committees’, the new organs of local government set up by left-wing activists as
the Red Army advanced. They supported land seizures but were also worried about
food supply in the coming year. This movement spread rapidly across the east of the
country despite the worries of the country’s new rulers, and was limited only by the
46 Ma´ria Ormos, To¨rve´nytelen Szocializmus: A Te´nyfelta´ro´ Bizottsa´g Jelente´se (Budapest: Zrinyi Kiado´ –
U´j Magyarorsza´g, 1991), 15–42; Szaka´cs and Zinner A ha´boru´ ‘megva´ltozott terme´szete’, 214–8; La´szlo´
Karsai, ‘The People’s Courts and Revolutionary Justice in Hungary, 1945–46’, in Istva´n Dea´k, Jan T.
Gross, and Tony Judt, eds., The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and Its Aftermath (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 233; Gyarmati, Botos, Zinner and Korom Magyar He´tko¨znapok,
108.
47 ‘Interna´lo´ta´bor U´jpesten’, Szabad U´jpest, 17 March 1945, 2.
48 Ge´za Ga´spa´r, ‘Amikor a munka bu¨ntete´s’, Jo¨vo´´ , 24 July 1946, 2.
49 Istva´n Bibo´, ‘A magyar demokra´cia va´lsa´ga’, repr. in Istva´n Bibo´, Demokratikus Magyarorsza´g:
va´lo´gata´s Bibo´ Istva´n tanulma´nyaibo´l (Budapest: Magveto´´, 1994), 43.
50 Ma´rai Memoir of Hungary, 122.
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shortage of available land.51 Land reform was legitimated by the new Popular Front
government and spread to the whole country as it was ‘liberated’. It was, however,
to have social and political consequences that were deeply conservative. Land reform
had more than 642,342 beneficiaries, of whom 370,963 had been manorial servants
or wage labourers in agriculture; by the time of the 1949 census there were 1,149,890
farms of between 1 and 20 kh,52 as opposed to 843,414 in 1935. Land reform also led
to an increase in the number of economically viable smallholdings.53 The propertied
classes in the villages were thus broadened, creating the basis for the spread of a
‘smallholder’ identity. This identity provided a common point of reference for the
propertied of the villages, uniting them in part against the political left and also against
those excluded from land reform.54
The reconstruction of rural communities around wider property ownership
combined with a decentralised political Catholicism in central and western Hungary.
The existence of a Catholic political culture in many Transdanubian villages rested
on the centrality of the Church to the local community, its dominant role in civil
organisations and the role that religion played in shaping the moral economy of
rural areas.55 The importance of church influence is underlined by examples such
as that of the village of Nagykara´csony in the central Hungarian Feje´r county. The
economy of the village had been dominated by a Church-owned manor prior to
land reform; in 1945 church property was transferred to former manorial servants.
Despite the opposition of the church hierarchy to land reform, the former manorial
servants proved impervious to the attempts of left-wing activists to mobilise them.
Local Church-based institutions and the priest continued to command the loyalty of
the new landowners.56
As the country moved towards free parliamentary elections in the autumn of 1945
that were supposed to seal the country’s transition to Popular Front rule, the MKP
leaders overestimated the strength of the social base on which their state-building
project rested.57 This was partly because the leaders of the party had taken the
huge increases in party membership, which reached 300,000 by August 1945, as an
indication of its level of support in the country.58 In reality, the left could only depend
on the support of the industrial working class and rural poor, since the middle class
was hostile to it and most of Hungary’s rural majority remained at best ambivalent
51 Ferenc Dona´th, Demokratikus fo¨ldreform Magyarorsza´gon, 1945–1947 (Budapest: Akade´miai Kiado´,
1969); Zsuzsanna Varga, ‘Az agra´rium 1945-to´´l napjainkig’, in Ja´nos Esto´k, ed., Agra´rvila´g Magyarorsza´gon,
1848–2002 (Budapest: Argumentum Kiado´ – Magyar Mezo´´gazdasa´gi Mu´zeum, 2003), 261–6.
52 A Hungarian land measurement; 1kh = 0.58 hectares.
53 Dona´th, Demokratikus Fo¨ldreform Magyarorsza´gon, 124–5.
54 Ma´rkus, ‘A Demokra´cia Ke´t E´ve Martonva´sa´ron’, 256.
55 Kata Ja´vor, ‘Az Egyha´z e´s a Valla´sossa´g Helye e´s Szerepe a Paraszti Ta´rsadalomban’, in Attila
Pala´di-Kova´cs, ed., Magyar Ne´prajz VIII.: Ta´rsadalom (Budapest: Akade´miai Kiado´, 2000), 791–818.
56 Andra´s Sa´ndor, O¨ve´k a Fo¨ld (Budapest: Szikra Kiado´, 1948), 9-31; Andra´s Sa´ndor,Hı´rada´s a Puszta´ro´l,
1945–1950 (Budapest: Sze´pirodalmi Ko¨nyvkiado´, 1951), 37–130.
57 Ma´tya´s Ra´kosi, Visszaemle´keze´sek 1940–1956: I ko¨tet (Budapest: Napvila´g Kiado´, 1997), 223.
58 ‘Gero´´ Erno´´ Ta´je´koztato´ja a Magyarorsza´gi Helyzetro´´l 1945. Augusztus 6’, in Lajos Izsa´k and Miklo´s
Kun, eds., Moszkva´nak Jelentju¨k . . .Titkos dokumentumok 1944–1948 (Budapest: Sza´zadve´g Kiado´, 1994),
67.
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and at worst similarly antagonistic. The restricted social base of the new state created
the opportunity for the FKgP to mobilise an alliance of the rural population and
the urban middle class around an alternative vision of the postwar state which rested
on strategies of legitimation different from those promoted by the left. This enabled
them to win an election victory that temporarily broke left-wing dominance over
the Popular Front coalition.
Political identities and the struggle over postwar Hungary, 1945–7
During autumn 1945 the left-wing parties moved to legitimate their state-building
project through the holding of municipal elections in Budapest and its neighbouring
industrial towns, and then national parliamentary elections. This attempt failed; the
FKgP won a clear majority in Budapest and 57.03 per cent of the vote in the
November 1945 parliamentary elections.59 While these elections gave institutional
form to the social and political division generated as a result of the incomplete
process of state formation that had proceeded throughout 1945, they also represented
a new stage in that process. This was because, first they demonstrated that an
alternative vision of the postwar state to that presented by the left-wing parties
enjoyed majority public support, one that promoted the political hegemony of
a transformed, democratised conservative politics that rested on broad property
ownership and parliamentary institutions. Second, this in turn generated a crisis
of legitimacy for the left to which the MKP responded by launching a bitter political
struggle between the left and the FKgP that paved the way for the country’s slide
into dictatorship at the end of the decade.
The social foundations of the FKgP’s winning electoral coalition were already
visible when the party reorganised itself during the first half of 1945. Outside the
socialist rural far south-east and the industrial areas, the party was able to win support
in eastern Hungarian villages by using its prestige as an advocate of radical land reform
in the interwar years to recruit smallholders, while many members of the interwar
rural middle classes joined the FKgP in large numbers.60 As its organisational drive
spread to central and western Hungary, the FKgP was well placed to benefit from the
spread of a ‘smallholder’ identity in the villages. In agrarian towns such as Martonva´sa´r,
smallholders of all classes, from the poorest to the wealthiest, were drawn to the FKgP
on this basis.61 In urban areas it was able to broaden its base further by appealing to
middle-class groups, who, in view of the collapse and discrediting of the interwar
59 In the Budapest local elections the FKgP polled 50.5 per cent of the vote to the 42.72 per cent
taken by the Workers’ Unity Front (an electoral alliance of the MKP and the MSZDP). No other party
or electoral alliance won more than 5 per cent of the total. In the parliamentary elections the FKgP took
57.03 percent, the MSZDP 17.41 per cent, the MKP 16.95 per cent, the National Peasants Party 6.87
per cent, the Bourgeois Democratic Party 1.62 per cent and the Hungarian Radical Party 0.12 per cent
(the statistics are adapted from Sa´ndor Balogh, Va´laszta´sok Magyarorsza´gon 1945: A fo´´va´rosi to¨rve´nyhato´sa´gi
e´s nemzetgyu´´le´si va´laszta´sok (Budpest: Kossuth Ko¨nyvkiado´, 1984), 109 and 147.)
60 Istva´n Vida, A Fu¨ggetlen Kisgazdapa´rt Politika´ja 1944–1947 (Budapest: Akade´miai Kiado´, 1976), 40–2.
61 Ma´rkus, ‘A Demokra´cia Ke´t E´ve Martonva´sa´ron’, 256.
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regime, had nowhere else to go. This lay behind the speedy organisation of the party
in the capital; by September 1945, on the eve of the municipal elections, opinion
pollsters estimated that 4 per cent of Budapest’s population were active in the FKgP.62
Anti-communism provided a key motivating factor for members of the middle class to
join the party; social observer Istva´n Ma´rkus reported that ‘when we asked the people
of Martonva´sa´r who became a “smallholder” there – they all replied unanimously
“those who didn’t want to be Communist”. The Smallholders’ Party thus became
the “anti-party” of the Communists in Martonva´sa´r.’63
The diverse coalition of interests represented within the FKgP made for a
divided party, in which intellectuals committed to democratic transformation, those
who sought to defend the interests of the propertied peasantry and middle-class
conservatives formed distinct factions. Yet it also gave the party a breadth of support
that the left lacked, enabling it to promote a new, democratised form of conservative
politics that could command widespread popular support. Aided by the political
blunder of the Allied Control Commission, which, by refusing to allow other
conservative parties to register, ensured that there was only one party around which
the right could unite, it mobilised that base of support as elections approached. The
FKgP’s electoral slogan in 1945 – ‘God, Homeland, Family’ – neatly encapsulated its
appeal to the rural propertied classes and emphasised its conservatism. Its programme
asserted that rural smallholders were the backbone of the ‘nation’, and it advocated
a liberal democratic political system and an economy based on private property with
welfare measures to support the family.64 Its rhetoric emphasised similar themes
in ways which appealed to its diverse support base. One of its spokesmen, Albert
Bereczky, argued in October 1945 that ‘the Smallholders’ Party wants a social and
a bourgeois Hungary; democracy today and democracy tomorrow, we want to be
Hungarians and to remain Hungarians tomorrow. We want private property today
and to live in a Hungarian way tomorrow’.65
The campaign emphasised themes of national independence which were combined
with attacks on MKP control of the police and demands for an alternative
future. Consequently the FKgP gained an electoral base that mirrored the social
composition of its membership. The FKgP took almost two-thirds of the vote in the
rural, conservative west of the country, where ‘smallholder’ identities and political
Catholicism were at their strongest.66 Its strong performance in urban areas without
62 Vida, A Fu¨ggetlen Kisgazdapa´rt Politika´ja, 46.
63 Ma´rkus, ‘A Demokra´cia Ke´t E´ve Martonva´sa´ron,’ 256. All translations are the author’s unless
otherwise indicated.
64 ‘A Fu¨ggetlen Kisgazda-, Fo¨ldmunka´s- e´s Polga´ri Pa´rt programja´bo´l’, repr. in Sa´ndor Balogh and
Lajos Izsa´k, eds., Pa´rtok e´s Pa´rtprogrammok Magyarorsza´gon (1944–1948) (Budapest: Tanko¨nyvkiado´, 1979),
175–84.
65 Quoted in Balogh, Va´laszta´sok Magyarorsza´gon 1945, 77.
66 La´szlo´ Hubai, ‘A Fu¨ggetlen Kisgazdapa´rt szavazo´ba´zisa´nak regiona´lis va´ltoza´sa, 1931–1947’, in
Tibor Valuch, ed., Hatalom e´s Ta´rsadalom a XX Sza´zadi Magyar To¨rte´nelemben (Budapest: 1956-os Inte´zet
– Osiris Kiado´, 1995), 439–41.
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significant working-class populations was evidence of the way in which it rallied
anti-communist middle-class votes.67
While the elections revealed the breadth of support for an alternative vision of
Hungary’s future to that promoted by the left and the MKP, the left retained a key
position in a continued Popular Front coalition government as a result of pressure
from the Soviet occupation authorities. By virtue of this continued pressure, their
ideological consistency and political skill, the Communists, formed the other pole
of politics in the limited postwar democracy. The MKP was able to participate
in postwar Hungarian politics on the basis that it was perceived as representing
the popular movement that had accompanied the Red Army’s advance. Its support
closely mirrored that of its project to create a postwar ‘new democracy’, though its
supporters often sought more radical changes than were allowed for by the party’s
more class-conciliatory Popular Front policies. In early 1945 the party attracted the
left-wing activists who created the first organs of factory democracy in the belief that
these would play a role in a ‘revolution from below’ which would accompany the
Soviet advance.68 As more of the country was ‘liberated’, the membership of the party
grew enormously; by mid-1946 6.7 per cent of the total population were members
of the MKP; 42.6 per cent of members were industrial workers, while a further
39.4 per cent were poorer smallholders and agricultural labourers. This membership
was concentrated in urban industrial areas, or in regions with an agrarian socialist
tradition such as the Viharsa´rok.69
The first major problem for the MKP in attempting to speak for the left in
Hungarian society and the ruling coalition was that it was not the only political force
that sought to represent it. In the countryside it faced the National Peasants Party
(Nemzeti Parasztpa´rt – NPP) that was the authentic representative of ‘populism’,
a variant of agrarian socialism based on a specific Hungarian ‘third way’ that had
been advanced in the 1930s by some writers and large sections of the provincial
intelligentsia. Though largely made up of intellectuals, it enjoyed some success in
winning support among poorer peasants.70 Furthermore, in the industrial centres
it faced the MSZDP. In the elections in November 1945 the MSZDP had polled
more votes than the Communists, and with some justice could claim to be a more
authentic socialist party. The elections gave, however, a misleading impression of its
strength. Weakened by the imprisonment of their leaders by the Germans in 1944
and damaged among sections of the industrial workforce by the conciliatory policies
it had pursued towards the Horthy regime in the interwar years, it was only able to
challenge the MKP for the allegiance of the working class in a limited number of
67 Vida, A Fu¨ggetlen Kisgazdapa´rt Politika´ja, 113–7.
68 Kovrig, Communism in Hungary, 161–9.
69 E´va Szabo´, ‘A Magyar Kommunista Pa´rt’, in Tibor Ere´nyi and Sa´ndor Ra´kosi, eds., Legyo´´zhetetlen
Ero´´: A Magyar Kommunista Mozgalom Szervezeti Fejlo´´de´se´nek 50 E´ve, 2nd edn (Budapest: Kossuth
Ko¨nyvkiado´, 1974), 175.
70 Istva´n To´th, A Nemzeti Parasztpa´rt to¨rte´nete 1944–1948 (Budapest: Kossuth Ko¨nyvkiado´, 1972);
Ga´bor Szirtes, A ‘gatya´s kommunista´k ?’ A Nemzeti Parasztpa´rt Baranya´ban 1945–1949 (Pe´cs: Panno´nia
Ko¨nyvek, 1993).
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industrial sectors and factories.71 During the immediate postwar years the proportion
of workers in its ranks fell, while ‘the proportion of the university-educated, factory
clerks, and employees increased considerably . . . . The MSDZP truly became a party
of workers living from wages and salaries, the university-educated, white-collar staff,
artisans, shopkeepers, and those belonging to the middle classes’.72 Its cross-class
composition increasingly came to reflect the fact that at the local level it attracted
those groups who supported forms of socialism but, for various reasons, disliked the
MKP. The party was racked by tension between the pro-MKP stance of its leadership
and the anti-communism of many of its activists. This tension would eventually lead
the party to collapse into impotent disunity.73
The second and most significant problem for the MKP, which it to some extent
shared with the whole of the left, was that the election results combined with
the dire economic situation had generated a crisis of legitimacy for their political
project. The survival of their vision of the postwar state rested on the support of
and the participation of the industrial working class in its local institutions. Electoral
defeat fed a crisis of confidence among the industrial working class in the left-wing
political leadership, which in turn was exacerbated by the effects of hyper-inflation
on working-class living standards. This crisis was effectively one of legitimacy in
that it raised the spectre of the collapse of the left’s vision of the postwar state in
the face of a triumphant centre-right and an outright withdrawal of working-class
trust. In August 1945 workers’ real wages stood at a mere 54 per cent of their
1939 level; by December they stood at only 13.8 per cent.74 Inflation on this scale
provoked resentment against those coming to sell their goods in the market, with
workers and the authorities accusing them of ‘speculation’.75 Workers believed that
a class of ‘speculators’ was enriching itself at their expense.76 This contributed in
turn to a feeling that the state was not sufficiently defending the workforce against
‘speculation’, ‘reaction’ and a resurgent prewar elite, a perception confirmed in the
eyes of many workers by the election results. This fuelled a working-class rebellion
against the MKP in the factories, as industry was hit by a wave of unofficial strikes
which began as early as the summer of 1945, intensified throughout the autumn and
continued into 1946. In one strike in one of the Ganz factories, of the plant’s 280
MKP members only five refused to down tools and thus obey the party’s anti-strike,
pro-reconstruction line.77
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As the FKgP attempted to press home its newly acquired electoral advantage in
early 1946, the crisis of the left and the postwar state intensified. While the MKP
remained in government through Soviet pressure, it was forced reluctantly to concede
power and influence to the FKgP, which enjoyed a parliamentary majority. Beyond
Budapest the pauperisation of the population had created a deep material and social
crisis in many industrial areas.78 According to local representatives of the left-wing
parties in the Dorog coal fields in early 1946, ‘thirty-five fatal accidents have occurred
as a direct consequence of the malnourishment of the workforce’.79 This exacerbated
class tension, for, as far as Tataba´nya miners were concerned, ‘the democracy is good
for the bosses, they are able to buy everything’.80 The difficulties created for the left
were underlined by the re-emergence of working-class antisemitism in response to the
failure of the new state to tackle inflation; according to one Budapest textile worker,
the miserable condition of the working population proved that ‘the Red Army only
liberated the Jews’.81 MKP-initiated campaigns against ‘speculators’ during 1946 that
were designed to deflect discontent revealed the tenuous hold that the party had over
the working class. They erupted into violence; in the worst incident, in the industrial
city of Miskolc, intensified campaigns against speculators resulted in the lynchings of
managers of the local mill by a crowd of 5,000.82
The MKP was forced to fight to regain the legitimacy its state-building project had
gained from the industrial working class, through seeking to reintegrate its social base.
This entailed a two-track strategy. It first concentrated on mobilising the workforce
against the FKgP, both to secure its own political power within the coalition and
to reassure its working-class base that it was committed to combating reaction. This
strategy of legitimation through mobilisation accepted the deep division of Hungarian
society and sought to play on it. Istva´n Bibo´ noted in early 1946 that ‘two forms of
fear’ tormented Hungarian society. They were ‘fear of a dictatorship of the proletariat
and fear of reaction’.83 The MKP used the widespread ‘fear of reaction’ to bind the
left-wing parties and the trade unions into an alliance under its leadership in early
1946 and to mobilise its social base against the FKgP.84 For Ma´tya´s Ra´kosi the success
of the FKgP was ‘the success of reaction’.85 The MKP denied the legitimacy of
the election by arguing that its victors were the enemies of ‘democracy’; Ra´kosi
himself argued in 1946 that ‘as a consequence of the unconstrained havoc caused
by the functioning of reactionaries inside the Smallholders’ Party the majority of
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the party stands passionately against the socialist workers’ parties and at one and the
same time directly and clearly has come under the influence of the cartels, the
banks and big capital’.86 This stance was used to justify the recourse by the MKP
to the use of blatantly undemocratic tactics against right-wing politicians. The MKP
was able to rely on its control of the parallel security state and the support of the
Soviets to continue with radical anti-fascist measures, despite the fact that parliament
and government were dominated by their opponents. This was combined in the
political sphere with the employment of the now notorious ‘salami tactics’ by the
MKP against right-wing politicians, within the FKgP. The radicalism of the left’s
constituency was mobilised to demand a continuance of anti-fascist administrative
measures. The security forces were used to root out ‘conspiracy’ among right-
wing politicians, and Ra´kosi, with consummate political skill and Soviet support,
was able to bully the Smallholders into accepting new ultimatums. ‘Salami tactics’
were to destroy the political coalition that the 1945 FKgP represented by initially
forcing the leadership to expel its right wing and then to attack its centre in
1947.
The second track of the left’s response was to address the problem of working-class
living standards directly. In the first half of 1946 the state, under pressure from the left,
attempted with only partial success to protect the value of workers’ incomes from
the effects of inflation by paying wages partly in kind and linking money wages to
the price of foodstuffs.87 When the government moved to end hyper-inflation with
a radical stabilization package that involved the introduction of a new currency, the
forint, in August 1946, the left-wing parties successfully fought to protect the living
standards of industrial workers and tied them to a wage system which embodied
the ideology of democratic, national reconstruction. The new wage system forced
every factory to establish a norm for each worker; this norm was to be set at 75
per cent of 1938 production in the same workplace. Thus the norm was statistically
established from historical company records. The link between the production target
and past production was made explicit. As a reward for fulfilling the norm an akkord
was to be paid; this was based on a wage scale based on the fulfilment of this
norm. It was steeply progressive and designed to use inequality of earnings based on
production as a motivating factor.88 The shifts in the wage system that accompanied
‘stabilisation’ did largely succeed in re-cementing the relationship between the MKP
and its working-class base, as well as generating new appeal for the ideology of
‘democratic, national reconstruction’. In the year following ‘stabilisation’ the large
increases in wages that the progressive nature of the akkord stimulated combined with
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controlled prices of many basic goods to produce substantial rises in working-class real
incomes.89 The relationship between the MKP and the working class was, however,
still characterised by problems. There was impatience at the continuation of private
ownership in industry and the continuity of managerial personnel where companies
had been nationalised. In Tataba´nya’s nationalised mines workers in the first half
of 1947 ‘complained that headquarters is absolutely full of reactionaries’.90 While
this kind of discontent was a concern, it fed a situation in which the MKP’s use of
undemocratic measures against the FKgP at national level was seen as legitimate by
industrial workers.91 Discontent at the poor supply of foodstuffs to industrial areas
remained a problem; consequently anti-smallholder opinion remained strong among
workers.92 By far the biggest issue that undermined support for the left, however, was
unemployment, which rose from 31,000 in August 1946 to 116,000 by December
1947.93
Though officially registered unemployment affected the industrial working class,
unregistered unemployment hit the rural poor. In the far south-east of the country
in early 1947, according to MKP organisers, ‘unemployment, inflation . . . and the
supply of bread were at the centre of public attention . . . in more than one place these
have led to demonstrations’.94 These problems had not begun in 1947, however, and
as the rural poor represented a significant constituency for the left, their support had
been fundamental. The rural poor were the product of the failure of land reform in
eastern Hungary to guarantee everyone an adequate plot of land.95 The landless were
natural supporters of the left and local FKgP activists regarded them with disdain, an
attitude rooted in the divisions of class and status prevalent in rural communities. As
one resident of the east Hungarian village of Tiszaigar remembered, ‘an agricultural
labourer, a manorial servant went in vain to the Smallholders’ Party . . . They didn’t
do anything’.96
The attack on the FKgP at the national level was combined with an MKP campaign
in rural areas that accused the FKgP of seeking a reversal of land reform under the
slogan, ‘We Will Not Give the Land Back!’. The campaign was one of militant
support for new landowners who farmed on the very edge of subsistence. They also
moved to institute a second wave of land reform that was based on the expulsion
of the country’s ethnic German population and the redistribution of their land to
those left landless in 1945.97 The 1946 expulsion of 116,959 ethnic Germans from
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Hungary was explicitly linked to land reform as their lands, mostly in the west of
the country, were redistributed to the landless poor from the east.98 Measures such
as resettlement and continued land redistribution allowed the left-wing parties to
retain the loyalty of the rural poor in the face of desperate economic circumstances.
They did not, however, solve the basic problems of the rural poor in class-divided
rural communities across the country. Villages continued to be divided between poor
smallholders and wealthier farmers.99
Conclusion: the politics of legitimacy and the social roots of dictatorship
A focus on what has been termed the politics of legitimacy – namely, the ways
in which the attempts of Hungary’s leading political actors to legitimate their rule
played out among subordinate social groups – has shed considerable light on the
social history of politics during the country’s transitional moment. It has shown how
long-term political affiliations rooted in divisions of culture, politics and class in
a deeply divided society provided a backdrop that conditioned responses to the
immediate postwar context. These patterns of long-term political identification
were not unchanging, however, and responded in a dynamic fashion to the social
transformations that occurred during the Second World War and the first postwar
months. These transformations, as the impact of land reform on the transformation of
Hungarian conservatism has shown, were often not those intended by political actors.
Shifting patterns of political identification both limited the freedom of manoeuvre
of political actors and determined the extent to which those actors were able to
construct a degree of legitimacy for themselves.
This focus has also shed light on the problems encountered by the postwar regime
in its relations with Hungarian society. It underscores the limits to the legitimation
of the left-wing project of an anti-fascist, socially radical ‘democracy’, given the
restricted social base that the left’s project could depend on in 1945. This was due to
the existence of alternative political traditions that either opposed or were excluded by
the left’s attempts at postwar state building. State formation and the clash between the
left and other political traditions produced division, which formed the background
to the struggle for legitimacy that ensued following the failure of the left to legitimate
its vision of the new political system through free elections. This failure occurred
because of the restricted social base of its project, but also because an alternative
project that rested on a new, democratised conservatism proved able to mobilise
those political traditions that were either opposed to or neglected by the left.
Faced with this rejection at the ballot box, the MKP and its allies shifted the
focus of their attempts to legitimate their rule, arguing that their opponents stood
for ‘reaction’ against the ‘people’. This strategy rested on the deep-seated division in
Hungarian society between those who embraced a socialist vision of the country’s
future and those who espoused a renewed, democratised conservatism. It also fed
on their mutual distrust. From late 1945 the MKP abandoned the pretence that
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it sought to represent the people as a whole, instead focusing its efforts on the
supporters of socialist transformation and labelling their opponents as ‘reactionaries’,
and thus enemies of democracy. While this shift in the focus of the MKP’s strategy of
legitimation does not in and of itself prove that the future political development
of Hungary was determined in 1945, it does suggest that the FKgP’s election
victory set in train a logic that created the social roots of dictatorship. While the
MKP was able to limit the impact of the FKgP’s parliamentary majority through
its control over the security services and Soviet control over the Allied Control
Commission, it mobilised its supporters as a means of legitimating its political
goals.
Hungary’s transitional moment ended with the destruction of the FKgP’s
parliamentary majority under the impact of ‘salami tactics’ and the subsequent semi-
rigged elections of August 1947, which gave the MKP the status of the country’s
largest political force.100 By that point the left had secured its political hegemony,
while it had established the economic and social institutions of the ‘new democracy’.
The country had a mixed economy characterised by state control of the banks, mining
and heavy industry governed by the Three-Year Plan, which aimed to complete the
process of postwar reconstruction and increase living standards. This was by no
means a Soviet system; much of industry and commerce remained in private hands,
and relations between the state and private industry were often characterised by
conflict over the issues of planning and state intervention. Society was more pacified
than it had been during the upheavals of the period between 1944 and 1946. Yet,
worryingly for the left, social divisions were increasing. For experienced farmers
who had benefited from land reform, the late 1940s were good years, whereas in
many rural communities there was a marked social polarisation as poorer and less
experienced recipients of land found it increasingly difficult to keep up. In addition,
there were those who had missed out on the land reform altogether, because of a
shortage of land, because they had been prisoners of war, or because of their ethnicity.
Unemployment, both industrial and agricultural, was extremely high.101
As the state embarked on the task of a further transition from Popular Front regime
to socialist dictatorship in late 1947 and early 1948, it was clear that the politics of
legitimacy that constrained the MKP during the Popular Front years would shape
the dictatorship that followed it. The state was based on the effective exclusion of
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the political centre-right and its broad base of support. Furthermore, its political
base lay among classes that were clearly subordinate and would have to be mobilised
around radical demands for greater social justice. Of necessity this locked the left into
a social logic that inexorably strengthened the dictatorial and repressive nature of the
emerging state, one that complemented the internal and external political processes
that were forcing a change of gear in communist policies across central and eastern
Europe from summer 1947.
